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Abstract 
This article analyses the evolution of the Islamist political associations and 
groups, both Shiites and Sunnis since the independence of Kuwait in 1962 to 
the last legislative elections which was held in 2016. It tries to assess the roles 
which the Islamist groups played in a relatively open political environment 
established by the constitution and the popular support these groups obtained 
along the interrupted electoral history in which the country witnessed.  
It also assesses the transformations which the Sunni Islamist groups 
suffered from the institutionalized opposition role they played until the Arab 
Spring events to the more informal opposition style since then.  
The article concludes by stating that this transformation negatively affected 
the popular support granted to the Islamists and hindered their influence in the 
policy making process in Kuwait, losing the opportunity that the Arab Spring 
uprisings provided for them.  
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Introduction 
In Kuwait, while political parties are not legal, political associations are 
permitted to participate in elections and also to form parliamentary groups. 
Islamist associations have been present in Kuwaiti politics even before the 
official creation of the Emirate and the promulgation of the constitution in 
1962. Moreover, since the reestablishment of the al Sabah rule after the 
                                                           
 Assistant Prof. at Qatar University / Email: lucianoz@yahoo.com 
  
 
76  International Studies Journal (ISJ), Vol. 15, No. 4 (60), Spring 2019 
  
liberation from Iraq in 1992, there has always been representation of Islamists 
in the National Assembly, which is the most influential and representative 
among the GCC states. The most active Islamist associations have been the 
Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) – the Kuwaiti branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood - the Salafi Islamic Alliance (SIA) and the Shia National Islamic 
Alliance (NIA). The three groups have pivoted back and forth between 
opposition and pro-governmental positions throughout history, but the two 
Sunni associations have become visibly opposed to the Sabah government 
since 2006, while the Shia group has become clearly pro-government. The 
opposition, together with tribal resistance to the implementation of some 
governmental policies, generated an almost permanent deadlock between the 
government and the legislature. The National Assembly was dissolved seven 
times between 2006 and 2016, following controversial electoral reforms and 
judicial resolutions that seemed to have served the government’s interests and 
reform agenda. While the ICM and Salafists, joint together in the ‘Islamic 
bloc’, have held an average 10-12 seats in the assemblies elected between 1992 
and 2009, this figure reached 23-25 after the February 2012 election, providing 
this assembly with the strongest Islamist presence ever, and certainly 
representing a challenge to the government. The dissolution of this assembly 
and the call for two consecutive elections in December 2012 and July 2013 –
amidst massive street demonstrations somehow fueled by the Arab Spring- 
caused both groups to boycott the electoral processes and to change their 
opposition strategies toward the government, moving to an open confrontation 
that ended with several former members of the assembly in jail, such as the 
prominent and controversial Musalam al Barrak, who stands accused of having 
insulted the Amir.1 These two elections were also held amidst the regional 
turmoil provoked by the victory and fall of Mohamad Morsi in Egypt and the 
Syrian war, that influenced to some extent the Kuwaiti Islamists political 
behavior, moreover since the neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and United Arab Emirates took direct measures banning MB or Salafist 
groups activities.  
Unexpectedly, the electoral boycott of the Kuwaiti Islamists came to an end 
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in the November 2016 elections, proving another change in the political 
strategy of Islamist associations that seemed to be aimed at recovering popular 
support through electoral means.  
 This article will focus on the strategies implemented by the Islamist 
associations in order to increase/preserve their presence within the National 
Assembly. It will identify the strategic changes that occurred mainly since, and 
as a consequence of the Arab Spring within the Islamist camp in order to 
capitalize the social discontent without endangering the regime survival, and 
avoiding being outlawed by the government, as it happened in neighboring 
GCC states.  It will also highlight how the regional context affected the local 
developments. 
 
Islamists associations and politics in Kuwaiti context 
The Article 4 of the 1962 Constitution (reinstated in 1992), established that 
the Kuwaiti political system is an “hereditary Emirate held in succession in the 
descendants of the Mubarak al Sabah.” It also states that the appointment of the 
Heir Apparent should be done with the consenting majority of a National 
Assembly,2 elected by universal suffrage.3 Elections were held since 1963, 
although barely in regular periods since the assembly was dissolved in 
numerous occasions and anticipated elections were called. There is no specific 
law governing the formation of political parties or political associations to 
participate in the electoral processes. The constitution specifically states 
‘associations’4 rather than ‘organizations’, allowing for further interpretation 
that may permit the eventual legalization of political parties.5 This is a common 
debate in diwaniyas and the written press, and among its stronger advocates is 
the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) group. Yet, there has not been any 
formal discussion at parliamentary level. Unlike other countries, the Kuwaiti 
law does not state any constraint on the religious character of the associations. 
The lack of proper party legislation did not, however, prevent the appearance of 
associations that behaved as ‘de facto’ parties, taking part very actively in the 
parliamentary and electoral life of the country, and in some cases, organizing 
themselves, and electing their candidates, as organized parties, such as the 
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ICM. Some also included the term ‘party’ in their definition like the Salafi 
Ummah Party (Hizb al Ummah). These ‘de facto’ parties represent the key 
political tendencies in the country, Nationalism/Liberalism, Populism, Sunni 
Islamism and Shia Islamism. The development of all these political tendencies 
during the first half of the twentieth century was possible due to Arab migrants, 
mainly from Egypt and Palestine, who came to the Emirate, and fostered by the 
liberal policies implemented by Sheikh Abdullah al Salem al Sabah.6 Most of 
the political trends that existed in newly established Arab regimes, including 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, opened their branches in Kuwait. The same 
is applicable to the Islamist groups during the second half of the century. 
Following the decline of Arab nationalist and leftist parties, as a consequence 
of the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the geopolitical shifts that 
occurred after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, Shia Islamist and Sunni 
Salafi movements were able to take root, penetrating the Kuwait’s economic 
and political elite.7 
For this author Islamism is defined as a political movement that favors 
reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by 
Islam. All the associations mentioned in the article falls under this definition 
despite the tools and mechanisms used to achieve their programmatic goals. 
 
The Islamist associations before the Arab Spring 
The best organized and most recognized political association in Kuwait is 
the Muslim Brotherhood-MB (Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), established 
unofficially in 1947 as the first Islamist group in Kuwait, after Abdul Aziz Ali 
al Mutawa met Hassan al Banna in Mecca and formed the first local cell. The 
formal creation of the branch came several years later, in 1952, with the 
registration of the Islamic Guidance Society (Jamiyat al Irshad al Islamiya), 
which pledged to spread Islamic culture among the new generations of 
Kuwaitis.8 The Kuwaiti branch was heavily influenced by its Egyptian 
counterpart until the 1980s, including in its organizational efforts and 
networking activities. Egyptian teachers and other officials sought refuge in 
Kuwait when Nasser started to take action against the organization after 1954, 
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thereby spreading their ideology in the emirate.9 Despite their increasing 
presence in Kuwaiti society, the MB failed to obtain a seat in the first 
legislative elections held in 1963, in which they presented four candidates. In 
the following two elections, in 1967 and 1981, their sole candidate got elected, 
but it was only in 1985 when the MB started to obtain a bigger representation 
in the National Assembly by gaining four seats from the nine candidates that 
ran under the MB banner. 
In 1989, the Constitutional Movement (CM) was established bringing 
together all political groups that believed in the Kuwaiti Constitution as the 
legal system of legislation and governance, including the MB. The MB did not 
participate in any protests or rallies during this period so as not to upset the 
government, showing their strategy of political engagement with the current 
institutional system rather than a more rejectionist or radical reformist 
approach. Moreover, during the Iraqi occupation, Brotherhood members were 
very active in organizing civil resistance and supplying assistance to citizens, 
showing their support to the ruling elite who were exiled during the occupation, 
and obtained recognition for their actions. 
After the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991 the MB 
established the Islamic Constitutional Movement-ICM (Al Haraka al-Dustoria 
al-Islamiya), or HADAS, following the Arabic acronym. The ICM became the 
political wing of the MB to take part in the renewed National Assembly, 
although it also included non-MB members.10 Although the MB did not 
disappeared as an organization, the use of ICM acronym represented the 
breakup with the main Egyptian branch, due to the lack of direct support to the 
Kuwaiti cause during the occupation. It also served to eliminate the uneasy 
name (Ikhwan) that recalled the Saudi Wahhabist group and its attempts to 
conquer the emirate in the 1920s.  
Initially, the ICM focused on a more ‘religious’ agenda, stressing the need 
to adapt the legislation to Shari’a, and to protect the Islamic character of 
Kuwaiti society. In this regard, they concentrated their efforts in amending 
Article 2 of the Constitution and pushing for a more conservative agenda at the 
social level. The article states that “the Islamic Shari'a shall be a main source of 
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legislation.” The ICM, as well as the Salafis, wanted that sentence to be 
amended as “the Islamic Shari'a shall be the main source of legislation.” After 
failing to get this amendment approved due to the lack of parliamentary 
support, and also realizing that too much emphasis on this would risk votes in 
further electoral contests and would also reduce the chances of the opposition 
imposing their agenda on the government, the ICM changed its strategy. By 
2009 they focused their attention on Article 79 of the Constitution,11 asking for 
the inclusion of a clause prohibiting any law violating Shari’a.12 In that same 
year the MP Hayef Al-Mutairi requested the amendment of the article but he 
failed in getting enough support in the chamber.13 
The change in the ICM agenda was linked to their participation in the 
assembly by his president, Dr. Badr al Nashi, in an interview in August 2008, 
when he stated: 
“I also believe that participating in the legislature has 
increased ICM interest in issues of political reform and 
development. Previously we focused more on general issues 
of morality and societal reform, but now we focus on 
specific issues such as educational reform, employment, the 
economy, and political issues such as electoral redistricting 
and reforming laws on publications and political parties.”14  
Thus, the ICM moved its priority to the consolidation of an opposition bloc, 
trying to negotiate between Salafists and Shi’a Islamists common proposals, 
criticizing governmental corruption and demanding more democratic reforms, 
such as having a Prime Minister elected by the National Assembly, a single 
electoral district to eliminate electoral gerrymandering and the legalization of 
political parties.15 In electoral terms, the ICM has had an agreement with the 
ISA to support their candidates in each district while the ‘four-votes rule’ was 
still possible. With the transformation to the ‘one man-one vote’ rule in 2012, 
the trans-Islamist support came to an end. However, these tactics were not 
always successful, due to the difficulties for both associations –Salafists and 
Shi’a Islamists- in overcoming their sectarian differences. While this strategy 
benefited ICM’s image as an ‘opposition’ group, making it the most powerful 
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and consolidated group in programmatic and organizational terms, the change 
towards a more democratic and institutionalist strategy made them a ‘normal 
political actor’, integrated in the institutional political life and using the 
democratic tools provided by the system. As Nathan Brown concluded in 2008, 
the ICM leaders felt that they had “become more democratic than the political 
system in which they operate –and perhaps more than Kuwaiti society is ready 
for.”16 For some Kuwaitis, this change in the priorities, from religious 
ideological principles to institutional ones, converted the ICM into an 
‘establishment’ party, rather than a group that advocated a reform of state and 
society. The fact that Ismail al Shatti, prominent figure of the ICM had been 
appointed Ministry of Communications in January 2006, may be an example of 
that. This may explain to some extent the inconsistent amount of seats the 
group obtained since 2008. While in 2006 they obtained the maximum number 
of seats in relation with the candidates nominated, six out of six, they were only 
able to obtain three out of eight in 2008, one out of six in 2009 and four out of 
five in February 2012.  
The second most important Islamist political group in Kuwaiti politics is the 
Salafis. Unlike the ICM, the Salafists have been unable to consolidate into a 
single grouping, being divided into several branches. The first is the Salafi 
Group (SG) (Al-Jama’ah al-Salaifah) established in the mid-1960s as an 
extension of the Wahhabi movement with prominent figures such as Nashmi al-
Nashmi, Mosaa’d al Abdul Jader and Khalid al Khadir.  Similar to other 
political groups at that time, Arab immigrants contributed to the organization of 
the SG, one of them being Sheikh Abdul Rahman Abdul Khaliq, a Palestinian-
Egyptian religious scholar residing in Saudi Arabia. The SG engaged in fierce 
competition with other religious groups (such as the MB-ICM) in Kuwait. As 
opposed to the ICM, the organizational structure of the group is not public, and 
names and identities of leaders remain anonymous. There is a Shura Council 
that acts as a supreme command and is responsible for the creation of group’s 
policies. The SG membership is restricted to those who regularly attend 
lectures and camps. The SG aims to create an Islamic state through legitimate 
channels including constitutional methods and without violent means.17 
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Following Abdul Khaliq ideals, the Salafists created the Society for the Revival 
of the Islamic Heritage (RIHS) in 1981, with the support of the state and 
wealthy Kuwaiti merchants who adopted the Salafi ideology. The RIHS served 
as an umbrella for political activities that included, apart from proselytism in 
mosques and diwaniyas, the presence in labor and student unions, where SG 
competed with MB activists.18 In the same year, the SG became the first Salafi 
political group in the Islamic world to nominate candidates for parliamentary 
elections.19 In the context of a strong Saudi influence, this Salafi trend, and the 
lack of interest in political and electoral involvement in their activists, was a 
demonstration of how different the political strategies were within the Kuwaiti 
institutional framework, where Islamist groups were able to actively participate 
in social and political activities without constraint. Since the creation of the SG, 
Salafist activists were aware of the influence that electoral engagement would 
have on the governmental decisions to Islamize the Kuwaiti society. In that 
1981 election, the two candidates nominated by the SG, Jassim al ‘Oun and 
Khalid al Sultan, won their seats.20 
The Iraqi occupation and further liberation also had a significant effect on 
the Salafists. As a result of an internal debate on their position towards the 
presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as obedience to 
the rulers, the Kuwaiti SG split into two different groups. A ‘purist’ branch 
split from the SG and gathered those who believed in the necessity of absolute 
obedience to the ruler, focusing on the “minute details of belief and worship”.21 
This group, Salafi Islamic Alliance-SIA (Al Tajammu al Salafi al Islami), 
participated in the 1992 elections for the first time and placed three out of eight 
candidates in the elected chamber. In that legislative term, the SIA proposed a 
law for the establishment of Public Authority for Propagation of Virtue and 
Prevention of Vice that faced strong criticism from liberal and Shi’a groups. 
While SIA MPs eventually withdrew the draft law, they succeeded in the 
adaptation of certain religious laws, such as preventing co-education in public 
schools, and also continued to push hard for the implementation of their 
religious agenda.22 
In 1996, an ‘activist’ trend that split from the SG emerged from within the 
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educated Islamist Bedouin population, and formulated a modern party program 
calling for a “thorough constitutional reform in the direction of a popularly 
elected government, free party formation and peaceful rotation of power 
between competing political tendencies.”23 These Salafi activists, calling 
themselves Salafi Movement-SM (Al-Harakah al-Salafiah), were followers of 
Abdul Rahman, who seceded from the RIHS in 1997. The most important 
figure among the young generation of Kuwaiti activists was Hakim al Mutairi, 
who studied in Mecca during the Iraqi occupation and returned and remained 
within RIHS establishing a haraki platform. He later left this group and 
contributed to the creation of, and led, the SM. 
The SM was very active against the alliance with the United States and 
advocated for a reform of the political system, including for the appointment of 
a Prime Minister by the elected parliament instead for the Amir.24 Walid 
Tabtabai, an outspoken member of the assembly, is considered to have close 
ties with the SM, although he does not officially belong to the group. The SM 
never developed a sophisticated institutional structure, but they managed to 
place their candidates in the chamber in all elections between 1996 and 2006, 
although their representation was always very low- one MP- with the exception 
of 2006 when they held two seats. Perhaps because of this failure in attracting 
popular support, one of the key figures of the SM, Hakim al Mutairi, decided to 
leave the SM to create a new group with the aim of becoming a well-structured 
and organized Islamist party. In 2005, Mutairi created the Ummah Party-UP 
(Hizb al Umma), which was the “was the first political group in Kuwait 
unequivocally to call for the sovereignty of the people as expressed in the 
power of the national assembly to decide who should form the government.”25 
While maintaining an Islamic agenda –the UP advocated for the establishment 
of Islamic State and the implementation of Sharia in all aspects of life, ending 
foreign military presence in the Gulf. The UM also supported the Kuwaitis’ 
right to choose and supervise the government, as well as the right to create 
formal political parties within a multi-party political system, and supported 
women’s political rights- in contrast to the positions of the purists Salafists or 
even ICM members. These political positions seemed to be oriented toward 
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preventing the electoral failure of the recently created organization. The UP did 
not participate in the 2006 elections due to their belief that the electoral process 
was corrupt, but participated in the 2008 elections, yet failed to get any of their 
candidates elected.26 
Despite the differences that provoked the division within the Salafist camp, 
the members of the different groups, as well as independent Salafists that did 
not belong to these groups, managed to participate in the diverse Islamic blocs 
that were created in order to push for an Islamic-oriented legislative agenda. 
For example, during the 2003-2006 legislative term, the SIA MPs Faisal al 
Muslim, Ahmad Baqer and Fahd Saleh Nasser, together with the SM MP 
Waleed al Tabtabai, and the independent Salafists, Abdullah Akash and Awad 
Barad, joined the ‘Islamic bloc’ led by the ICM, and voted for the reform of the 
electoral law within the ‘29 bloc’. They also voted together against granting 
women’s political rights, with the exception of Barad. Their collaboration also 
extended to some petitions signed to question the Prime Minister in 2008 and 
2009.  
The Shi’a Islamists, who represent around 15 percent of the Kuwaiti 
population, were significantly affected by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
1979. While some groups officially followed the teachings and leadership of 
the Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor, Ali 
Khamenei, facing strong rejection and criticism within the Kuwaiti society, 
they had to reaffirm their loyalty to the Sabah ruling family and Kuwait by 
showing an absolute pro-government position within the National Assembly. 
The Shi’a Islamists organized mainly around the National Islamic Alliance-
NIA (Al-Tahaluf al-Islami al-Watani) and the Justice and Peace Assembly-JPA 
(Tajammu al Adala wa al Salam). The NIA was created in 1998 as an 
alternative to a previously existing group, the Islamic National Coalition-INC, 
which appeared after the liberation of Kuwait and had participated in the 1992 
elections, obtaining at least one seat.27 This group had been previously the 
Hezbollah of Kuwait, created in the 1980s following the Islamic Republic 
rhetoric. Thus, members of NIA follow the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei.28 This 
ideological cleavage did not prevent the strong support provided by NIA to the 
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Sabah ruling family during the Iraqi occupation, and the collaboration on 
specific issues and governmental policies. Although some Shi’a Islamists 
supported the electoral reform in 2005 that reduced the electoral districts from 
twenty-five to five and were very active in the so called ‘Orange movement’ in 
2006, the NIA remained broadly supportive of the ruling family.  
 Justice and Peace, a group composed by followers of the Ayatollah Sadiq al 
Shirazi, was active in Kuwait since the 1970s with a clear pro-governmental 
position, that granted them the reputation of being the ‘yes men’ within the 
parliament.29 The JPA had a very low representation in the assembly, just one 
seat in the 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2013 elections.  
 
The Kuwaiti Islamist Associations after the Arab Spring 
When the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia in November 2010 making the 
whole Arab world to tremble, with thousands of people, mainly youngsters, 
demanding for change in the streets, the ICM, along with other opposition 
groups, were already engaged in an agenda focused on institutional reform and 
fight against corruption. Earlier in the Spring of 2006, a movement demanding 
an electoral reform demonstrated in the streets of Kuwait wearing Orange t-
shirts.30 The movement translated into the ‘Bloc 29’ within the National 
Assembly, referring to the 29 MPs that voted for the electoral reform. This 
previous experience can explain, on one hand, why the most violent protests 
took place only one year later on 17 November 2011 when the National 
Assembly was stormed by protesters, after corruption accusations formulated 
against at least 16 MPs because of irregular multimillion dinar deposits in their 
banks accounts. On the other hand, it can also explain why, despite that event 
and the following demonstrations and repression, neither the demonstrators nor 
any political group demanded for regime change nor the Emir’s resignation, but 
just the government resignation. Following the storming of the assembly the 
Prime Minister Nasser al Sabah and his cabinet resigned, forcing the 
dissolution of the legislative chamber on the 7th December and anticipated 
elections by 2 February 2012. The experiences of May 2006 and November 
2011 somehow proved that the combination between public demonstrations and 
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coordination between political groups contributed to get the popular demands 
fulfilled without endangering the regime stability.  
The Islamist groups were able to capitalize the spontaneous demonstrations 
and popular unrest to obtain electoral gains. The tone of the whole electoral 
campaign and debates in January 2012 was very aggressive. Tension was 
evident when the campaign tent of Mohamad al-Juwaihal, a pro-governmental 
candidate, was burned by members of the al Mutairi tribe, who felt insulted by 
him.31 The al Watan television was also stormed by tribal supporters while a 
candidate, Nabeel Al Fadhl, was being interviewed.32 Massive rallies were held 
in numerous tents, mainly key figures such as Musalam al Barrak, where strong 
anti-governmental speeches and slogans were proclaimed.33 
The results of the polls showed an increase of the ICM presence in the 
assembly with four elected members, Osama Issa Majed Saleh, Jamaan 
Herbish, Hamad al-Matr and Mohamad Hussein. Faysal al Yahia, Mohammad 
Dalal and Falah al-Sawag al-Azami and Khalid Shajir al-Mutairi were 
considered closed to the ICM as well, although they did not run under their 
banner officially.34 This relative victory encouraged the ICM, jointly with the 
Salafists and independent Islamists, to create the 20-member ‘Islamic bloc’. 
Together with other tribal members and MPs from the Popular Action Bloc,35 
the ‘majority bloc’ formed the most oppositional parliament since the 
establishment of the emirate, with 35 members.36 With that majority, the 
Islamist MPs were able to force some decisions from their own religious 
agenda, such as passing a law imposing the death penalty for blasphemy and 
insulting the prophet.37 In this case the Shi’a Islamists voted against the law, 
since their request of including the penalty for insulting the twelve Imams in 
the bill was not accepted.38 The Sunni Islamists felt strong enough to follow 
their own reformist agenda, without compromising with non-Sunni allies with 
which they might agree upon other issues such as institutional reform and fight 
against corruption or Islamizing the society. 
Following a temporary suspension of the assembly in June, and after the 
February 2012 elections being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 
the 2009 parliament was reinstated amidst an increasing popular discontent and 
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a legal battle between the government, the MPs and the Constitutional Court. 
Finally, the reinstated assembly was dissolved by the government in October, 
calling for new elections by December 2012 with an amended electoral law. As 
a result, the ICM, jointly with most of the country’s opposition groups (the 
Islamic Salafi Alliance; Islamic Ommah Party; Popular Action Bloc; The 
National Action Bloc; The Democratic Forum and the Bedouin tribes Awazem 
and Ajmans) decided to boycott those and July 2013 elections, declaring them 
unconstitutional.39 The ICM and some other groups went to the streets to 
protest against the governmental policies, with dozens of protesters sent to jail 
after security forces intervened to dissolve the demonstrations. During that 
period, the ICM seemed to have moved towards a more confrontational 
strategy against the government, literally taking the street with massive protests 
along October and November 2012. The most important demonstration took 
place on 15th October, when Musalam al Barrak warned the Amir about driving 
Kuwait into the abyss of autocracy. The slogan 'We will not allow you' then 
became the symbol of this delayed Kuwaiti Arab Spring during the 
demonstrations that took place for several months.40 As a result of this, a court 
sentenced in February 2013 three former MPs – Falah al-Sawwagh; Bader al-
Dahoun (Islamists), and Khaled al-Tahous (Popular Action Bloc)- to jail terms 
for insulting the Amir, in addition to the prosecution of Musalam al Barrak on 
the same charges. Later, in January 2015, an ICM member, Mubarak al 
Duwaila, was also detained for charges against security of the state.  
At this point, the presidential victory and mandate of the Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi in Egypt became an influential factor in 
the regional politics, mainly affecting the intra-GCC relations. Even though the 
ICM and the KMB had cut their ties with the Egyptian branch in the 1990s, the 
ascension and fall of the Brotherhood in barely one year –June 2012 to July 
2013, and the following declaration of the MB as a terrorist organization by 
Saudi Arabia, undoubtedly affected the ICM and the KMB relation with the 
government and other political forces.  
By September 2012 an effort to unify the opposition failed in attracting the 
Salafists to the National Front to Protect the Constitution, formed by the ICM 
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and the Popular bloc.41 In November 2012 some pro-government MPs, such as 
Nabil al Fadhl had launched campaign with the slogan “Loyalty to the 
homeland, enmity to the Brotherhood” to discredit those protesters linked to the 
brotherhood, and accusing them of looking to replicate the Morsi’s model for 
Kuwait.42 The ICM positioned themselves strongly criticizing the coup against 
Morsi in July 2013 and the Kuwaiti government support to the military in 
Egypt.43 Under a crossfire and without parliamentarian presence due to the 
electoral boycott the ICM started to become isolated from positions of 
influence and also from the Kuwaiti society. 
The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by 
Saudi Arabia government on 7th March 2014,44 jointly with diplomatic rift 
within the GCC on the Internal Security Agreement,45 and the deepening of the 
regional sectarian confrontation, only aggravated the situation of the ICM and 
the brotherhood in Kuwait. Clearly, the government benefited from the ICM 
disgrace and previous boycott electoral strategy that weakened the whole 
opposition. 
After almost four years of boycott, and following the dissolution of the 
National Assembly in October 2016, the ICM, as well as most of the opposition 
groups, decided to re-enter the institutional arena by presenting candidates in 
the December elections. According to scholars interviewed in Kuwait, the 
dissolution was unexpected and without justification, since the assembly was 
controlled by pro-governmental groups and MPs. The only explanation 
provided was that the government had anticipated the opposition’s decision to 
end their boycott in time for the elections to be held in July 2017. With 
upcoming elections, the ICM and ISA would have less time to organize 
themselves. The government’s strategy was partially successful since the ICM 
was only able to get three of its candidates elected to the chamber.46 However, 
the ICM remained well positioned bearing in mind the difficulties the faced 
since the beginning of the Arab Spring. According to Cafiero, this is due to the 
‘pragmatism’ that the ICM was able to exercise in the demands to the 
government, abandoning the strictest religious agenda focusing on the 
liberalization of the political system, and negotiating with non-Islamist forces.47 
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In the Salafi camp, the SIA has had almost a permanent presence in the 
Kuwaiti parliament since 1981, with the exception of the assembly elected in 
December 2012, when they boycotted, and November 2016, when they got no 
seat. However, their presence in the chamber never exceeded four 
representatives, and this highest number only occurred in the 2008 and 
February 2012 elections. Moreover, although officially the SIA boycotted the 
elections in December 2012 and July 2013, two rogue members, Abdulrahman 
Saleh Salem Abdullah and Ali Saleh Mohamad al Omair, contested and won 
their seats in 2013 elections. This move, together with the general trend of 
division among the Salafi cadres, showed the different approaches toward 
electoral engagement within the movement. The move, however, seemed to 
have backfired against the SIA, as in 2016 they lost all their seats in the 
National Assembly. Most analysts and scholars interviewed after the November 
2016 election agreed that the main losers of this last electoral process were the 
SIA activists. 
In 2013, and perhaps after learning about the Egyptian Brotherhood failure 
and the increasing regional pressure against Salafi movements, the Kuwaiti 
Salafists seemed more willing to collaborate with opposition groups and to 
push for a limited political reform with a pragmatic rather than ideological 
approach.48 In that sense, Waleed Tabtabai and Hakim al Mutairi were very 
active in the anti-governmental demonstrations along 2012 that ended with the 
UP member Mutairi (and others) condemned to jail terms. 
After the Arab Spring the Salafists joined the demonstrations and electoral 
boycott coordinated with the other opposition movements, trying to benefit 
from the popular unrest and looking for a meaningful presence in the assembly 
in order to push for their own religious agenda. But, the Salafists gradually 
changed their strategy to one less confrontationist with the government, and 
distancing themselves from the ICM, mainly after July 2013 when the Morsi 
experiment in Egypt arrived to an end. The Salafists joined in the boycott of the 
December 2012 and the July 2013 elections, with the exceptions of Abdullah 
and al Omair in 2013 elections, and also voted in favor of some governmental 
proposals along the term. As well as ICM and other opposition groups, the 
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Salafists decided to reappear in the November 2016 elections, as they 
considered that they had failed in preventing a bigger deterioration of the 
country, in abolishing electoral reform, and in avoiding the government 
corruption. They also considered that boycotting the election would undermine 
their options in the future, something that proved to be true, since Salafist 
groups failed to obtain any seats in the new chamber. For some analysts, the 
Salafists failed to fill the gap left by the MB. The fact that key Salafist figures 
had participated in 2013 elections, and that in January 2014 Ali al Omair had 
accepted a position as Minister, meant that the Salafists has shifted to more 
pro-government positions, something that diminished their appeal among 
young tribal-Islamist voters.  
The main difference of the impact of the Arab Spring in comparing the ICM 
and Salafists, is that while the ICM remained united along the whole process, 
from the street demonstration to the return to the elections, the Salafist suffered 
from a strong fragmentation, mainly due to the different approach the purists 
and activists portrayed in face of the revolts. For Pall, the Salafism was 
‘radically [] restructured’ as a result of the Arab Spring since the purists and 
‘reformist’ revised their positions regarding the obedience to the rulers and the 
right to protest.49 As a result of this post-Arab Spring fragmentation, the 
electoral strategies of the diverse Salafist candidates proved to be an absolute 
failure, since no seat was achieved in November 2016. 
On the Shi’a Islamist camp, the NIA did not participate in the electoral 
boycott promoted by the opposition in 2012 as a result of the massive street 
protests, thereby benefitting in the December elections, obtaining five seats in 
the chamber out of five candidates nominated. In this case, the impact of the 
Bahrain uprising demanded a clear pro-regime position in order to prevent 
distancing from the government and the other political groups. However, this 
did not contribute for a better understanding with Sunni Islamist MPs in 
pushing for political reform. The sectarian divide following the Arab Spring, 
raised the suspicion of Shi’a politicians. While in December 2012 the NIA was 
clearly benefited from the boycott, obtaining five seats out of five candidates, 
the performance in the 2016 election was modest, obtaining only two seats out 
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of four candidates nominated. Prominent former MPs Faisal al Duwaisan and 
Hussein al Qallaf were among the losing candidates. It is possible to assess that 
apart from the electoral reform that implemented the ‘one man-one vote’ rule, 
the end of the opposition boycott and divisions within the Shi’a groups 
drastically reduced the chances of the Shi’a Islamist groups in elections. 
It is possible to speculate that the Shi’a Islamists, much more than their 
Sunni Islamist counterparts, put aside their ideological principles in order to 
preserve their political influence in the decision making process, or at least to 
remain visible within the National Assembly in order to reinforce their position 
within the system, in order to overcome the challenges that being Shi’a 
represented post-Islamic Revolution and post-Arab Spring. However, this 
strategy seemed to fail in the electoral process if the 2013 and 2016 elections 
are considered. 
 
Conclusion 
The characteristics of the electoral system that allows religious oriented 
candidates to run for office even without legalizing political parties promoted a 
very active participation of several Islamist groups, that groups to adapt their 
strategies to fit within the existing system and downgrade their ideological 
convictions to gain more support from voters and survive at the electoral and 
parliamentary level. 
As it was shown, before the Arab Spring the Islamist groups focused more 
on electoral goals than in programs, and once within the chamber, they tended 
to form alliances to push for changes but without disregarding the future 
electoral impact of their positions. Despite their influence in society through 
their activity in charitable organizations, and that the ICM and the Salafists 
groups prioritized participation in electoral processes, they proved to be 
unsuccessful in their bids for participation in the chamber. The electoral 
strategies implemented by all groups have failed to obtain a significant 
representation in any of the elected chambers since 1963 to the Arab Spring. 
Moreover, it was proved that neither the ICM, nor the Salafists or Shi’a 
Islamists were able to influence the decisions made by the chamber on their 
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own, nor was it always necessary to reach compromises to push for a common 
agenda.  
The need to set aside ideological differences to concentrate on pragmatic 
objectives, that were eventually detrimental to their own electoral aspirations, 
as proved in November 2016 elections. Moreover, the more substantive 
collaboration among Islamist groups, mainly the ICM and Salafists, were 
related to institutional and pro-democratic reforms, rather than to Islamizing the 
Kuwaiti society. When the opposition was able to control the chamber, as it had 
in 2006 and 2012, the government dissolved the assembly and called for new 
elections. 
The Arab Spring represented an opportunity for the Islamists groups to 
capitalize the social discontent and to become relevant in parliamentarian 
policy making. The experience of February 2012 parliament proved to be 
satisfactory mainly for those included in the opposition bloc, including ICM 
and Salafists, but it lasted very short to prove to be successful long term, 
moreover having in mind the regional events that indirectly affected Kuwait. 
Being an outsider to the chamber and the electoral processes demonstrated 
two things to the opposition. First, non-institutionalized opposition would be 
drastically repressed by the government. Second, without representation in the 
chamber visibility within society and capacity to influence policy making is 
greatly reduced. The fear of losing social influence seems to be the reason 
behind the decision to end the electoral boycott and to participate in the 
November 2016 elections, disregarding the fact that there was disagreement 
with the electoral framework that ruled the process, even though they were  
unsuccessful in obtaining the expected results. This last point seems to 
demonstrate that ICM, Salafists and Shi’a Islamists seemed to have lost their 
capacity to influence the society outside the electoral system, to the benefit of a 
younger and proactive generation of activist/Islamist candidates. However, the 
Islamists groups seemed to have little choice but to abide with the institutional 
and electoral framework set by the constitution and to work within the system 
to maintain the opportunity of influencing at least to some extent governmental 
affairs. Given the fact that they have had to adapt to this situation since their 
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creation, they are hostages of their own strategies that privilege the electoral 
outcomes in spite of constrains imposed by the government. 
Sunni and Shi’a Islamists, candidates and seats obtained 1963-2016 
 Sunni Islamists 
Group MB/ICM Close to MB SIA Umma Party 
Election seats cand. seats cand. seats cand. seats cand. 
2016 3 4 1 1 0 1   
2013     2 2   
2012/12         
2012/2 4 5   4 4   
2009 1 6 1 1 2 5   
2008 3 8 1 1 4 5 0 8 
2006 6 6   2 6   
2003 2 11   3 6   
1999 4 12 0 1 2 7   
1996 5 12 1 1 2 4   
1992 4 9 0 1 3 8   
1985 4 9   1 2   
1981 1 1   1 1   
1967 1 1       
1963 0 4 0 1     
 Sunni Islamists Shi’a Islamists 
Group Salafi Mov. Indep. Salaf. NIA Justice & Peace Other 
Elect
ion 
seats cand seats cand seats cand seats cand seats cand 
2016   0 1 2 4     
2013     1 1 1 1   
2012     5 5     
2012     2 2 1 1   
2009   0 1 1 2 1 2 2 4 
2008     1 1     
2006 2 2   2 2 0 1   
2003 1 1 2 3 0 2 1 1   
1999 1 1 0 2 1 2     
1996 1 1 2 5       
1992   0 1 1 1     
1985   1 4       
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